Canadian Family Law Matters

June 2022
Number 396

TORT OF "FAMILY VIOLENCE" PROVIDES NEW WAY TO SEEK DAMAGES FOR DOMESTIC ABUSE

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In ***Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia***, 2022 ONSC 1303 (CanLII), the Ontario Superior Court of Justice affirmed a new common law tort of "family violence" as a way to award damages resulting from family violence and abusive domestic behaviour. While such conduct is, unfortunately, an aspect of many family disputes, there was no clear avenue for victims to pursue damages as part of family court proceedings prior to this case.

In ***Ahluwalia***, the applicant husband and the respondent wife sought to address various family law issues arising from the breakdown of their marriage, including property equalization, child support, and spousal support. In addition, the wife sought damages in relation to the husband's alleged abuse during their marriage. The wife adduced evidence of mental, emotional, and physical abuse that she had endured throughout the marriage. The wife also argued that her husband had stifled her ability to seek out gainful employment in order to assert his economic dominance and was aggressive towards her attempts to gain any independence.

The husband denied the allegations of family violence or that he was coercive or controlling. He further argued that allowing the tort claim to proceed in a family law case risked the trial process being weaponized and negatively affecting the former spouses' ability to co-parent into the future.

In the Reasons for Decision, the court referenced the 2021 reforms to the ***Divorce Act***, noting that Parliament had explicitly recognized the devastating, life-long impact of family violence on children and families. Accordingly, family violence is relevant to the issue of parenting. However, despite the statutory recognition of financial and psychological abuse, the court noted that family violence could not be compensated through a spousal support award because section 15.2(5) of the ***Divorce Act*** prohibits consideration of spousal misconduct when making such an award. As such, spousal support awards are not meant to censure particularly egregious conduct during the family relationship that calls out for aggravated or punitive damages.

Given that the ***Divorce Act*** does not provide the victim with a direct avenue to obtain reparations from harms flowing directly from family violence and that go beyond the economic fallout of the marriage, Justice Mandhane accepted that creating the tort of family violence provides for a remedy that properly accounts for "the extreme breach of trust" occasioned by the husband's violence, and that "brings some degree of personal accountability to his conduct."

In addition to spousal support and child support, the court awarded $150,000 in aggravated and punitive damages to the wife, who was found to have experienced a

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16-year relationship characterized by a pattern of emotional, mental, and psychological abuse, coupled with an inherent breach of trust.

When it comes to developing new causes of action in tort and expanding liability, trial judges possess the scope to do so where the interests are worthy of protection and the development is necessary to stay abreast of social change. Importantly, even though this particular tort is novel, it appears to be in line with the language of the statutory definition under section 2 of the ***Divorce Act***, which defines "family violence" as the following:

Conduct by a family member towards the plaintiff, within the context of a family relationship, that:

1. is violent or threatening, ***or***
2. constitutes a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour, ***or***
3. causes the plaintiff to fear for their own safety or that of another person.

In essence, the decision outlined three means by which a plaintiff can establish that they experienced family violence. Under the first mode of liability, the plaintiff must establish that the family member intended to engage in conduct that was violent and threatening. Under the second mode of liability, the plaintiff must establish that the family member engaged in behaviour that was coercive and controlling. The third mode of liability requires that the plaintiff establish that the family member engaged in conduct that they would know, with substantial certainty, would cause the plaintiff's subjective fear.

Furthermore, for a tort of family violence to be established in a proceeding, the plaintiff will have to plead and prove on a balance of probabilities that a family member engaged in a pattern of conduct that included more than one incident of physical abuse, forcible confinement, sexual abuse, threats, harassment, stalking, failure to provide the necessities of life, psychological abuse, financial abuse, or killing or harming an animal or property.

In the context of damage assessment for family violence, therefore, it is the ***pattern*** of violence that must be compensated, not the individual incidents. The tort claim cannot rest on a series of bald assertions but must be particularized using specific examples identifying the pattern of coercive and controlling conduct.

This focus on a more inclusive view of how family violence manifests itself in a pattern of repeated and abusive conduct removes legal barriers facing survivors leaving violent relationships. Further, the court's attempt to address family violence in this way may avoid stereotypical misconceptions as to why survivors of family violence often choose to remain in abusive relationships or fail to complain to the police.

For survivors of family violence or domestic abuse, this new tort may mean an opportunity to present evidence of years of abuse endured throughout the entire course of the relationship during a family law proceeding. This significantly differs from previously limited redress through the tort of spousal battery or intentional infliction of emotional distress, which required the victim to plead compensation for specific, individual incidents. More importantly, by allowing a family law litigant to pursue damages for family violence as part of their already existing family law proceedings, this decision has direct implications for access to justice. Victims may no longer have to pursue both family and civil claims to receive different forms of financial relief or reparations for harms stemming from a violent relationship.

The decision has yet to receive any appellate consideration and whether the new tort becomes an established part of Ontario law remains to be seen.

LEGISLATION UPDATE

British Columbia

Bill 8, the *Attorney General Statutes (Hague Convention on Child and Family Support) Amendment Act, 2022*, received Third Reading on March 28, 2022, and Royal Assent on March 31, 2022. Bill 8 amends the *Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act*, SBC 2002, c. 29, to, amongst other things, amend the definition of "support order" to include decisions and maintenance arrangements under the *Hague Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance* and add a new part on the implementation of the *Hague Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance*. Bill 8 also amends the *Family Law Act*, SBC 2011,

c. 25, at section 155, to clarify that the child support service may only recalculate child support if a copy of the relevant order or agreement is given to the child support service. Sections 1 to 4 and 6 to 12 of the Act come into force by regulation of the Lieutenant Governor in Council. The remaining sections came into force on the date of Royal Assent.

Manitoba

Bill 17, *The Family Law Act, The Family Support Enforcement Act and The Inter-jurisdictional Support Orders Amendment Act*, received First Reading on March 9, 2022, and Second Reading on April 25, 2022. Bill 17 repeals the *Family Maintenance Act*, CCSM c. F20, and replaces it with two new Acts, *The Family Law Act* and *The Family Support Enforcement Act*. *The Family Law Act* will govern parentage determinations, parenting arrangements for children post-separation, guardianship, child support, and spousal and common-law partner support. The Act includes recent amendments made to the *Family Maintenance Act* respecting assisted reproduction. Part 3 will replace the concepts of custody and access with parenting arrangements, parenting time, and decision-making responsibility. The Act will contain new provisions allowing step-parents or other family members to seek parenting time or decision-making responsibility without having to apply for guardianship. New provisions will also deal with the relocation of children. *The Family Support Enforcement Act* will replace Part VI of the *Family Maintenance Act*.

Yukon

Bill 11, *Act to Amend the Child and Family Services Act (2022)*, received First Reading on March 9, 2022, and Third Reading and Royal Assent on March 31, 2022. Bill 11 amends the *Child and Family Services Act*, SY 2008, c. 1. Amendments include repealing and adding certain definitions, including the new definitions "24/7 facility or home", "extended family member", and "Yukon First Nation". Amongst other things, Bill 11 amends and updates the Act's Guiding Principles, Service Delivery Principles, and best interests of the child factors. The amendments come into force on proclamation.

RECENT CASES

No Error in Finding Husband Not Entitled to Occupational Rent Dating Over 20 Years Back

British Columbia Court of Appeal, February 3, 2022

The appellant husband and the respondent wife married in 1981, separated in 1996, and divorced in 2004. Post-separation, the wife and children remained in the family home, held as a joint tenancy. In 2006, the husband transferred his interest in the property to the wife in order to facilitate using the property as security for a loan for the child's mortgage. In 2016, the mortgage to assist the child was paid out. In 2017, the husband filed a petition, seeking a declaration that he was the beneficial owner of an undivided one half interest in the property pursuant to a resulting trust, and an order for partition and sale, half the rent the wife received from renting a portion of the property out, and occupational rent dating to 1996. The application judge found that the husband had a 28 per cent interest in the property, amounting to $30,000, and therefore lacked the requisite half-interest to seek partition and sale (see *Lennox v. Lennox*, 2018 BCSC 374, 2018 CFLG ¶27,417). The Court of Appeal allowed the husband's appeal in part and, in 2019, an application judge found that the wife held the husband's interest in the property on a resulting trust that became a bare trust once the mortgage to assist the child had been paid out. The husband was found to be entitled to a vesting order as to a 27.8 per cent interest in the property, based on the appraised value of the property at $250,000 and the husband's interest being one half of that amount, less the costs of maintenance. The claim for occupational rent was rejected. The husband appealed.

The appeal was dismissed. The determination of whether to award occupational rent was discretionary and was entitled to deference. It was appropriate for the lower court judge to consider the family context of the claim; the husband's extreme delay in bringing the claim; the fact that the entire property had never been rented out; and the fact that the husband had not been ousted from the property, had not lived or sought to live there for over 20 years, and had left the

wife to maintain the property over many years without assistance or contributions. The Court noted that one reason that the property was not fully rented out was that the parties' children were living there, and it further noted that the husband had paid nominal child support. Accordingly, it was particularly inequitable for the husband to seek full market rent from the wife for the years when the children lived in the home. It was further open to the lower court judge to conclude that it was unfair to the wife that she had no notice that the husband would be seeking occupational rent after such a long period. The Court found that the judge had considered the benefit the wife derived from living at the property by making her account for the rent she received over the years. The Court concluded that the decision to dismiss the occupational rent claim did not amount to an injustice. The husband's calculation of his interest in the property was based on a property appraisal that had been rejected by the lower court judge. The record also did not support the husband's argument that the wife's expenses had been double-counted, once when determining the net rent received by the wife and again when determining the wife's cost of maintaining the property. There were no errors in the lower court's judgment.

Lennox v. Lennox, 2022 CFLG ¶27,839

Judge Erred in Refusing to Grant Divorce on Husband's Application

British Columbia Court of Appeal, February 8, 2022

The appellant husband and respondent wife married in 2016 in India, where the wife resided. The husband had travelled from Canada to India for the wedding and returned to Canada mid-2017. He was unable to sponsor the wife to Canada. In October 2020, he filed a notice of civil claim seeking a divorce and no other relief. In December 2020, the wife filed a response opposing the divorce. In March 2020, the husband filed a notice of application, seeking a divorce order. In April 2020, the wife filed a counterclaim, seeking a division of property and spousal support. The husband filed a response, opposing the relief. At trial, the judge declined to grant the divorce, finding that there was a potential risk of prejudice to the wife, considering four factors: the wife's residence in India and the current pandemic restrictions that made it difficult for her to instruct counsel; the husband's position that the wife was not entitled to spousal support or equalization; the wife's allegation that the husband made incomplete financial disclosure; and the husband's unavailability for an examination for discovery. The husband appealed.

The appeal was allowed. A judge had discretion to grant a divorce on the application of one spouse before the parties settled or received judgment on property and support issues if there was no prejudice or substantial risk of prejudice to the other spouse. The trial judge erred in requiring the husband to provide reasons for granting him a divorce to which he was otherwise entitled that "outweighed" the risk of prejudice "alleged" by the wife. It was the party opposing the divorce who had to establish that granting the order would give rise to a risk of prejudice, at which point the burden shifted to the party seeking the divorce to show that the order should be granted. The prejudice to the spouse opposing the divorce had to arise from their loss of status as a spouse. The Court found that the four factors the judge relied on were not capable of meeting the applicable test. The wife's loss of status as a spouse would not affect her difficulty in instructing counsel due to her residence in India and its pandemic restrictions. Further, it was clear that the wife had been able to instruct her counsel, having regard to the filed materials. Pursuant to case law, a divorce was not to be withheld as a means to compel a party to enter into a settlement of other issues. The last three factors considered by the trial judge related to the husband's disputing of the wife's property and support claims, and it was clear that the trial judge declined to grant a divorce to incentivize the husband to come to the table to deal with those claims. The wife had failed to show that actual prejudice or a reasonable likelihood of prejudice would flow from her loss of status as a spouse. There was no principled basis on which to refuse a divorce. The Court granted the divorce.

Gill v. Benipal, 2022 CFLG ¶27,840

Cause of Action for Division of Family Property Survived Death

British Columbia Court of Appeal, February 25, 2022

The appellant husband and the wife married in 1993 and separated in 2005. The wife died 15 years later, in July 2020. The husband and wife had not obtained a divorce order and did not have any family law agreements, court orders, or outstanding proceedings between them. A notice of family claim was issued in November 2020 by the respondent

administrator of the wife's estate. In the claim, the administrator sought, amongst other things, an order for equal division of family property and family debt under the *Family Law Act*, SBC 2011, c. 25 (the "FLA"). The husband filed a response in February 2021. He then brought an application to strike the family law claim, taking the position that the administrator did not have standing to bring the claim and the court was therefore without jurisdiction to hear it. In May 2021, the chambers judge dismissed the application (see *Weaver Estate v. Weaver*, 2021 BCSC 881, 2021 CFLG ¶27,769). The judge rejected the husband's submission that, under s. 198 of the FLA, only a living spouse could bring a claim for the division of property, or that s. 150 of the *Wills, Estates and Succession Act*, SBC 2009, c. 13 (the "WESA"), had no application to the case. The husband appealed, taking the position that the finding that the wife was no longer a "spouse", as she was deceased, was fatal to the administrator's claim.

The appeal was dismissed. The Court agreed with the chambers judge's finding that s. 150 of WESA preserved causes of action for property division on behalf of deceased spouses, as long as the time limits under s. 198 of the FLA had not expired. The chamber judge's interpretation gave effect to a purposive reading of the two statutes. The FLA's purpose was expanding protection for different types of spouses and making family property law clearer and easier to understand for persons subject to it. The policy rationale underlying s. 150 of the WESA was that "valid claims should not be barred by the death of the deceased". The Court further noted that ss. 3, 94, and 198 of the FLA did not specify that only a living spouse could bring a claim for division of property. There was also no language in the FLA excluding the application of s. 150 of the WESA. Had this been the legislature's intention, it could have included language to that effect. Section 150 of the WESA excluded certain claims such from its ambit yet did not provide that it excluded family property and family debt claims. As s. 150 came into force after the enactment of the FLA, the legislature would have been aware of s. 81 of the FLA, being the "right to an undivided half interest in all family property as a tenant in common, and [equal responsibility] for family debt", and the vested interest that flowed from it on separation. This cause of action survived death and was preserved by s. 150 of the WESA. The Court further found that the husband's interpretation would result in a gap that effected an injustice, as a separated and surviving spouse could seek division of family property against the estate of a deceased, but the estate could not avail itself of the same relief.

Weaver Estate v. Weaver, 2022 CFLG ¶27,841

Payor's Income Increase Not Significant Enough to Warrant Increasing Spousal Support

British Columbia Supreme Court, January 7, 2022

The claimant wife and respondent husband married in 1994. They had three children, aged 16, 21, and 27. Post-separation, the children resided with the wife. In 2012, the parties entered into a consent order that provided for a review of child and spousal support in five years. In 2018, the husband's application to reduce child support was allowed, as the eldest child was no longer a child of the marriage. In 2020, a trial judge found that the middle child suffered from a brain injury that caused him to remain a child of the marriage for support purposes. The judge calculated monthly support for the middle child by deducting his Persons with Disability benefit from his monthly expenses, with the husband paying 74 per cent of the shortfall, at $693 per month. The support was to be reviewed after April 2022, as the child could become eligible for further benefits. The trial judge also varied spousal support, finding that the husband had reduced his work hours due to medical reasons, warranting a reduction in his income from $104,000. His new income was imputed at $84,000. The wife was entitled to compensatory and non-compensatory spousal support at $477 per month, at the high end of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines range, until April 2023. The husband's income for 2020 was $110,749. The parties each applied to vary the 2020 order.

The wife's application was allowed in part and the husband's application was dismissed. The Court did not accept the husband's submissions that the middle child was now able to withdraw from the care of his parents. Evidence that the child received higher disability benefits, was employed part-time at a gym, and that his employer praised his progress on social media did not establish that the child could care for himself without assistance. The Court found that the 2020 order contemplated the potential for the child's increased benefits and current part-time employment and it therefore did not constitute a material change in circumstances. Both factors were reasons for the ordered review, which the husband was still entitled to seek after April 1, 2022. The husband's evidence was that his 2020 income for support purposes was actually $93,000, as the $110,749 income included a $16,386 withdrawal from his RRSP to pay for legal expenses, a $2,500 one-time payment for back-pay owing to him from previous years, and $1,086 paid for union dues. The Court

accepted that the RRSP withdrawal and union dues were to be excluded from the husband's income for support purposes. Accordingly, the husband's 2020 income was $93,277, which was higher than that predicted in the 2020 order. The higher income warranted an increase in child support. The Court did not find, however, that an increase in spousal support was warranted. The trial judge had been aware that there was some uncertainty in predicting the husband's future income owing to his health issues. The Court did not find that the difference between $84,000 and $93,277 was significant enough to justify a variation. There was therefore no material change in circumstances in regard to the spousal support order. The husband was ordered to pay increased child support retroactive to July 2021, at $878 per month for the youngest child.

Galloway v. Galloway, 2022 CFLG ¶27,842

Antagonism Between Parents Raised Concerns About Cooperation if Relocation Allowed

British Columbia Supreme Court, February 11, 2022

The claimant mother and respondent father divorced in 2019. They had two children, aged eight and 11. Pursuant to a 2019 order, the parenting schedule involved the children being with the father one day during the week and every second weekend. Both children attended elementary school in Aldergrove, B.C. The father was in arrears of child support payments of over $20,000 as of January 2021. In October 2020, the mother provided written notice that she intended to relocate with the children to Osoyoos, B.C. The mother's stated reasons were that she was in a new relationship with someone whose business operated largely in the Okanagan and she wished to attend a notary public course in Kamloops or to obtain her paralegal certification at Simon Fraser University in Kelowna. The mother obtained a legal assistant position in a law firm in Osoyoos. The father applied for an order prohibiting the mother from relocating with the children to the Osoyoos area and for equal parenting time. In the time since the application was brought, the mother married her new partner.

The application was allowed in part. Under s. 69(4) of the *Family Law Act*, SBC 2011, c. 25, the mother was required to satisfy the Court that the proposed relocation was made in good faith and there were reasonable arrangements to preserve the relationship with the father. If the above was established, the relocation would be presumed to be in the children's best interests. As the mother did not provide evidence regarding her intentions to become a notary public or legal assistant, the academic requirements, or employability potential, the Court found that her assertions about pursuing enhanced training and qualifications were to be looked upon with "some skepticism." The sworn statement of the children's daycare provider indicated that the mother referred to the father by inappropriate names to the children and discussed family law matters with the father in front of the children. This raised significant concerns about the mother's willingness to support a meaningful relationship between the children and father. The distance between the two points would require extensive cooperation and accommodation. The Court concluded that the claimant's proposed relocation was not undertaken in good faith. The proposed schedule was also not reasonable, as it would require extensive travel by the children over mountainous roads through extreme weather. The Court did not find that it was in the children's best interests to relocate. The children expressed that they enjoyed a close connection to extended family and to friends in their current location and that they were exposed to their parents' disputes. The father's intentional and ongoing refusal to pay child support was the factor that militated most strongly in favour of allowing the relocation. The Court ordered that the mother was not permitted to relocate the children to Osoyoos. Due to the parties' antagonism, the Court refused to order shared parenting.

J.M.R. v. D.M.R., 2022 CFLG ¶27,844

Judge Erred in Finding Ontario Court Did Not Have Jurisdiction to Make New Support Order Under *Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act, 2002*

Ontario Court of Appeal, February 24, 2022

The respondent mother and father married in Finland in 2003 and divorced in 2004. They had two children. The father resided in Ontario since 2007. The mother resided in Finland with the two children. In 2010, the mother was awarded custody by the Finnish court and the father was ordered to pay child support. The father was personally served with the

Finnish originating application and was present during the proceedings, with counsel. The father's appeal was dismissed by the Finnish court in 2011. The father did not pay child support. In 2014, the appellant Interjurisdictional Support Orders Unit (the "ISO Unit") received a request from the Minister of Justice in Finland to register the Finnish orders in Ontario for enforcement, claiming support arrears of 32,929 Euros. The orders were registered in Ontario under s. 18 of the *Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act, 2002*, SO 2002, c. 13 (the "Act"). The father's motion to set aside the registration under s. 20(2) of the Act was granted. The motion judge found that the father did not have notice or a reasonable opportunity to be heard in the Finnish proceedings. In 2018, the ISO Unit learned that the father had provided misleading information in the motion materials, including that he was about to move to Morocco. The ISO Unit brought a motion in the Ontario Court of Justice seeking child support pursuant to s. 21 of the Act. The motion judge made a support order. On appeal, the Superior Court of Justice quashed the motion judge's decision for want of jurisdiction. The ISO Unit appealed.

The appeal was allowed. The Court considered whether an Ontario court had jurisdiction under s. 21 of the Act to order child support where there was a valid foreign support order that was unenforceable in Ontario. Section 21 states, "[i]f the registration of an order made ... outside Canada is set aside under [s. 20], the order shall be dealt with ... as if it were a document corresponding to a support application received under [s. 9(2)] or a support variation application received under [s. 32(2)]". The Court noted that the core scheme of the Act was to establish a fair and workable system for providing child and spousal support where the payor parent or spouse lived in a different jurisdiction. The Court found that the language of s. 21 was triggered by the father's conduct. The father had set aside the Ontario registration of the Finnish support order, thus removing his obligation to provide support, to the extent that it was enforceable in Ontario. The ISO Unit had invoked s. 21 to remedy the egregious situation, namely, the dishonest obtaining of the Ontario order and the non-compliance with the Finnish order. Section 21 specifically empowered an Ontario court to hear a new support application, taking into account the unenforceable foreign order and other information the Court considered necessary, and to make a new support order. Section 21 explicitly provided for "the exact remedy sought", the Court stated, and the order of the Ontario Court of Justice had been correct. It was not open to the appeal judge to quash the lower court's order for want of jurisdiction.

Krause v. Bougrine, 2022 CFLG ¶27,846

Parent Who Did Not Want to Vaccinate Children Had More Child-Focused Approach

Ontario Superior Court of Justice, February 22, 2022

The applicant father and respondent mother had three children, aged 10, 12, and 14. The eldest child resided primarily with the father and the younger two children resided with the mother. Pursuant to a final order based on minutes of settlement signed in October 2021, the father had sole decision-making authority with respect to the oldest child and the mother had sole decision-making authority with respect to two younger children. The order required the parties to consult with each other prior to making major decisions for the children. The older child had made the choice to obtain the COVID-19 vaccine. The mother took the position that her extensive research left her with well-founded concerns that the potential benefit of the current COVID-19 vaccines for the younger children was outweighed by the serious potential risks. The children had both had COVID-19 with minimal symptoms and recovered. The children did not have any medical issues. The parties obtained a Voice of the Child Report in June 2021, which provided that both children presented themselves confidently and thoughtfully stating that they did not wish to have the vaccine. The father brought a motion in January 2022, requesting that the younger children receive the vaccine.

The motion was dismissed. The Court expressed concern over the trend of "intolerance, vilification and dismissive character assassination in family court" with respect to those holding an opposing position on the COVID-19 vaccine issue. It further critiqued the concept of "judicial notice" being "hijacked from a rule of evidence to a substitute for evidence". With regard to the Voice of the Child Report, the Court noted that the children outlined very specific reasons for their decisions that did not appear frivolous, superficial, or poorly thought-out, and expressed strong views about not wanting the vaccine. There was no evidence that the mother had inappropriately influenced the children. The Court found that the father was treating the children's and the mother's views as not worthy of consideration. The Court found that in recent cases where a child's stated opposition to the vaccine was overridden, the Court had made unfavourable

findings with regard to the objecting parent's rationale and their inappropriate influence; found that the pro-vaccine parent provided more reasonable and credible information; and had more confidence in the pro-vaccine parent's parental judgment and insight. The Court found that in the instant case, the mother presented her evidence in an extensively researched, articulate, and child-focused manner. The father, in turn, came across as intolerant, focusing on discrediting the mother's ideas. The mother's evidence included a detailed fact sheet from Pfizer as to side-effects and quotes from leaders in the medical and scientific community. The Court found that the mother's position was more reasonable in that she invited discussion and exploration of both sides. Her request for a cautious approach was compelling and was reinforced by the children's views. It was in the children's best interests that the mother have sole decision-making authority on the issue of the younger children's COVID-19 vaccine.

J.N. v. C.G., 2022 CFLG ¶27,851

OTHER NEWS

Alberta

Continuing Legal Education

On June 14, 2022, the Legal Education Society of Alberta presents "Advanced Negotiation Techniques for Family Lawyers" in Edmonton. The event will be chaired by Ken Proudman of BARR LLP and Heather L. McKay, QC, of Daunais McKay & Harms. The program will present approaches for successful negotiation in emotionally-charged circumstances. For more information or to register, visit: https://www.lesaonline.org/event/advanced-negotiation-techniques-for-family-lawyers-edmonton.

New Brunswick

Child Support Recalculation Service

New Brunswick has introduced the Child Support Recalculation Service, which allows families to keep child support in line with parents' incomes without the need for attendance at court. For those who enroll in the service, child support amounts will be automatically recalculated each year. Families with a court order or agreement for child support that is filed with the court where both parents live in New Brunswick are eligible to apply. Either a recipient or payor of child support may apply. For more information, see https://www2.gnb.ca/content/gnb/en/departments/public-safety/justice/content/child-support-recalculation-service.html.

Ontario

Continuing Legal Education

On June 27 and June 28, 2022, the Law Society of Ontario presents the replay of the 16th Family Law Summit, a webcast-only program co-chaired by Kelly D. Jordan of Kelly D. Jordan Family Law Firm and Shawn Richard of Lenkinski, Carr & Richard LLP. The program will focus on changes resulting from evolving attitudes toward the practice of family law, including the increased recognition of alternative methods of dispute resolution, the advent of new technologies, and the challenges of the pandemic. Lawyers, judges, and experts will present on the latest case law and trends. For more information or to register, visit: https://store.lso.ca/16th-family-law-summit-replay.

CANADIAN FAMILY LAW MATTERS

Published monthly as the newsletter complement to the *Canadian Family Law Guide* by LexisNexis Canada Inc. For subscription information, see your Account Manager or call 1-800-387-0899.

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